



Dili International Conference on the post-2015 Development Agenda

'Development for all: Stop conflict, build states and eradicate poverty'

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BACKGROUND PAPER

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Introduction

Discussion on what international development goals might succeed the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) was until 2012 relatively muted and technical, for fear that it might distract attention from the need to accelerate progress toward the MDGs. With the formation of the United Nations High Level Panel of Eminent Persons¹ on the post-2015 Development Agenda, and a series of related processes of consultation and reflection, we are now seeing the emergence of a broad-based discussion on all aspects of the post-2015 goals - their purpose, the principles underlying them, their content and the process for reaching final agreement upon them by 2015.

In this context, the narrative developed by the g7+ group of fragile states² and reflected in the *New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States*³, which was agreed at the November 2011 Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, takes on a new character. It is no longer merely a call for supplementation of the MDGs with peacebuilding and statebuilding goals; it now functions as a call for the post-2015 goals explicitly to recognise the fundamental importance of sustained peace and well-functioning states, capable of providing access to justice, delivering essential services and fostering an enabling environment for inclusive growth and decent jobs. In the same way, the narrative developed by small-island developing states, and other countries particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change and externally-generated crises, now functions as a call for the post-2015 goals explicitly to recognise the fundamental importance of environmental sustainability and resilience to external shocks.

The purpose of this paper is to consider some of the most significant questions about the post-2015 goals from the perspective of fragile states, including but not limited to the 30 countries that make up the g7+ membership and the Pacific island countries.⁴ Fragile states are far from a homogeneous grouping, principally because for some the source of fragility is violence, while for others it is smallness and remoteness. However, one thing that unites them is their desire for the international community to accord greater importance to the fundamentals of peacebuilding and statebuilding as both a condition and an ultimate goal of national development.

In what follows, we discuss the main benefits and shortcomings of the MDGs for fragile states, reflect on how the world has changed since the MDGs were drafted, and outline the necessary parameters to ensure the post-2015 framework addresses the learning from the MDGs and the priorities of the people living in fragile states. In doing so, we have structured this background paper around the first set of framing questions adopted by the UN High Level Panel, and intend it to generate country-led discussions at the Dili international conference about the focus of the development agenda beyond 2015, with the view that these discussions will in-turn inform the deliberations of the High Level Panel.

¹ For details of the Panel members and their terms of reference see <http://www.un.org/sg/management/hlppost2015.shtml>

² Comprising: Afghanistan, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Liberia, Papua New Guinea, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, Timor-Leste and Togo.

³ The 'New Deal', which builds on the vision and principles articulated from the Millennium Declaration to the Monrovia Roadmap, proposes key peacebuilding and statebuilding goals, focuses on new ways of engaging, and identifies commitments to build mutual trust and achieve better results in fragile states. See <http://www.g7plus.org/new-deal-document/>

⁴ Comprising the 18 countries listed in footnote 2 together with Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Republic of Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu (note: Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands are members of the g7+).

1. What have the MDGs achieved? What lessons can be learned about designing goals to have maximum impact?


An overview of MDG progress

Based on UN monitoring information it appears still to be true that, as the 2011 World Development Report said, ‘no low-income fragile or conflict-affected country has yet achieved a single MDG’.⁵

It is impossible to generalise about fragile states, not least because there is no generally agreed definition of state fragility or even an agreed list of fragile states. Some definitions—which tend to cite unwillingness or inability to provide essential services—are more applicable to conflict-affected states, including post-conflict states; others are more applicable to states with small populations and limited resource endowments, located far from international markets. Lists of fragile states vary markedly, with the OECD list currently covering 47 countries, the World Bank list 35 countries and bilateral donor lists varying numbers. In addition, the UN’s list of Least-Developed Countries (LDCs), which can reasonably be considered fragile states, contains 49 countries. Of the 18 g7+ member countries, 16 are universally regarded as fragile, appearing in both the OECD and World Bank lists and also being classified as Least-Developed Countries (LDCs).⁶ A further seven countries, none currently members of the g7+, also fall into this ‘core fragile’ category.⁷

Given this ambiguity about the universe of fragile states, we show below how four selected groupings of fragile states are faring against the MDGs: the Pacific island countries (PICs), some of which do not appear in standard lists but are considered fragile in certain dimensions by their own governments and by their major donors; the g7+ member countries; the ‘core fragile’ countries; and the LDCs.

Figure 1: Proportion of countries expected to have met each MDG by 2015⁸



⁵ At least if one excludes Bangladesh, which appears only in the OECD fragile states list. Bangladesh is recorded as having achieved MDG3, the gender equality and women’s empowerment goal.

⁶ Côte d’Ivoire appears in the OECD and World Bank lists but is not an LDC. Papua New Guinea appears in none of the three lists. While it appears likely to meet the criteria for classification as an LDC, this designation is only applied to countries that request it, which Papua New Guinea has not.

⁷ These are Angola, Eritrea, Kiribati, Myanmar, Nepal, Sudan and Yemen.

⁸ Source: ‘2012 Pacific Regional MDGs Tracking Report for the Pacific Island Countries’ likelihood of achieving MDGs, and www.mdgmonitor.org and individual country reports for other countries. Note: MDG 1 has been re-defined for the Pacific Island Countries; therefore progress is not comparable to that of other countries.

What is striking from Figure 1 above is that no country in the g7+ grouping, or the larger 'core fragile' grouping, is on track to meet MDG1, the 2015 poverty eradication goal, or MDG7, the environmental sustainability goal. These countries are also performing particularly poorly against MDG5, the maternal health goal. In addition, few Pacific island countries are on track to meet MDG1, though it should be noted that the poverty reduction target has been redefined in terms of a locally-defined 'basic needs poverty line,'⁹ as absolute poverty is rare in the Pacific. The LDCs and Pacific island countries are generally performing closer to the developing country average against the other goals, with the exception of MDG3, the gender equality and women's empowerment goal. However, the overall picture is quite bleak. Most countries in the selected groups are likely to fail to achieve most of the MDGs. With the exception of the Pacific island countries in relation to MDG4, the child mortality goal, no more than half of the countries in each group will achieve any given MDG by 2015.

How have the MDGs benefited fragile states?

Several attempts have been made to assess the impact of the MDGs in general.¹⁰ Such impacts could in principle occur in four main areas: development-related discourse, resource mobilisation and allocation, donor and partner country practices, and development outcomes. There is general agreement that the MDGs have achieved a large impact on development discourse, when compared with earlier attempts to propagate international development goals in a more piecemeal fashion throughout the 1990s. However, this impact is mostly limited to people who regularly talk to each other about international development—the MDGs are still unknown to the vast majority of ordinary people.¹¹

As for the other three areas above, nobody has claimed to be able to demonstrate a relationship of probable causation between observed changes during the MDG 'era', from about 2001, and the adoption of the MDGs. This is largely because changes, such as the aid 'boom' that commenced around 2000 and continued for a decade, and the policy commitments embodied in the 2005 Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness, might have been brought about not by the MDGs, but by the same sentiments and contextual factors that led policymakers to adopt the MDGs. One important exception here is the widespread use by donors and developing country governments of the MDGs, sometimes supplemented or modified, for the purposes of planning, reporting and public communication. This shows a clear impact at the process level, though not automatically an impact in terms of resource allocation and development outcomes. With that caution in mind, we consider what specific benefits the MDGs might have conferred on fragile states.

First, it may well be the case that the adoption of the MDGs brought about an overall increase in aid to fragile states. It certainly coincided with such an increase. Figure 2 below displays trends in aid from members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) for our four selected country groupings, from the MDG baseline year of 1990 to the most recent year for which data are available, 2011.

Figure 2: DAC ODA flows 1990-2011 (constant 2010 US\$m)¹²

⁹ This concept is explained in Box 2 of the *2012 Pacific Regional MDGs Tracking Report*, published by the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat.

¹⁰ One good example is a 2010 paper by Andy Sumner and Meera Tiwari, "Global poverty reduction to 2015 and beyond: what has been the impact of the MDGs and what are the options for a post-2015 global framework?," Working Paper 348, Institute of Development Studies.

¹¹ The Centre for Global Development reports that only 5-6 per cent of people in the two largest donor countries, the US and Japan, have ever heard of the MDGs (Charles Kenny and Andy Sumner, "More Money or More Development: What have the MDGs Achieved?," Centre for Global Development Working Paper 278, 2011).

¹² Source: QWIDS (OECD DAC database)





Figure 3 below charts the same aid flows as a proportion of total DAC aid, showing that while DAC aid rose considerably in the period - increasing by more than 60 per cent in real terms - aid to 'core fragile' states more than doubled as a proportion of total aid, from five to 13 per cent. The story is of course similar for the g7+ countries, of which 16 are in the former category, but the share of aid provided to LDCs and Pacific island countries actually fell slightly, reflecting the fact that the increase has gone principally to conflict-affected countries.

Figure 3: Flows as proportion of total DAC ODA (constant 2010 US\$m)¹³



The trends displayed above are consistent with other analysis, which has shown that additional aid has flowed disproportionately to countries most off track in achieving the MDGs.¹⁴ Second, it is clearly the case that the MDGs have provided a useful framework for national development strategies. In some cases, the MDGs are at the heart of such strategies; in others, they are referenced; in still others, they are less prominent but their emphasis on planning and managing for measurable results is present. It has been estimated that of 118 countries surveyed by UNDP, some 86 per cent had incorporated at least some elements of the MDGs into national development planning frameworks.¹⁵ A UNDP study of 30 countries found that ten had added or modified goals, 15 had added or modified targets and 25 had added or modified indicators.¹⁶ While there is no information readily available on how prevalent is the adoption or customisation of the MDGs among fragile states, it is reasonable to assume that countries with weaker strategic planning capacities would derive particular benefits from, and thus be more likely to adopt, an MDG-based planning framework. However, as stressed above, this is not to say that development outcomes are thereby automatically improved. What is, perhaps, improved is the quality of dialogue between governments and

¹³ Source: QWIDS (OECD DAC database)

¹⁴ For example, see page 14 of Claire Melamed and Andy Sumner's 'A Post-2015 Global Development Agreement: why, what, who?' (Overseas Development Institute/UNDP, 2011), citing unpublished UNDP research.

¹⁵ See page 10 of the 2010 UNDP report *Beyond the Midpoint: Achieving the Millennium Development Goals*.

¹⁶ Cited in Richard Manning's 2009 paper, "The Impact and Design of the MDGs: Some Reflections", *Institute of Development Studies Bulletin*, Volume 41, Number 1.

citizens, and also between governments and their donor partners, about national development objectives and progress toward them.

Third, and finally, to the extent that the adoption of the MDGs might have brought about an increase in aid to fragile states, it might also have accelerated development progress in certain key dimensions. Most obviously, progress in relation to access to vaccines and drugs, educational enrolment and the availability of improved water sources might be linked to the priority accorded to these areas by donors, in some cases through the allocation of resources to new 'vertical' funds, in the context of the MDGs. There is evidence that the MDG era has seen accelerated progress toward most MDGs among LDCs and in sub-Saharan Africa, with at least half or more countries accelerating on at least four MDGs.¹⁷ According to the UN's 2012 MDG Report, sub-Saharan Africa - which has the highest level of under-five mortality - has doubled its average rate of reduction, from 1.2 per cent per year in the period 1990-2000 to 2.4 per cent in the period 2000-2010. And, according to the same report, global progress in reducing mortality from tuberculosis and malaria, diseases that disproportionality afflict fragile states, has also accelerated.

How have the MDGs failed fragile states?

Again, much can be and has been said about the limitations and deficiencies of the MDGs in general. So, before looking at them through a fragile states lens, we briefly rehearse four of these general criticisms.

- First, the MDGs are faulted for the way in which they were developed, which is seen as technocratic, non-transparent and essentially donor-driven.
- Second, the MDGs are criticised as being unfair on certain countries, which might show impressive development progress while still being assessed as 'off track' against global proportional reduction targets. Here the concern is that global goals and targets, which were really meant to apply to the 'average' country, have come to be applied to every (developing) country - as for example in our own Figure 1 - which effectively sets a much higher bar than originally intended.
- Third, and somewhat contrary to the previous point, the MDGs are criticised for being unambitious, with targets that were conservatively extrapolated from previous experience and were in some cases watered down relative to earlier targets.
- Fourth, the MDGs are universally criticised for underplaying or leaving out several of the fundamentals of global, national and human development, including some specified in the Millennium Declaration. There is no agreement on exactly what these fundamentals are but among the most frequently cited are equitable growth; peace, security (in various forms) and respect for human rights; effective, transparent and accountable governance; access to energy and 'connectivity' through physical infrastructure; and access to family planning services. The absence of some of these items is sometimes blamed for a stagnation in investment in the productive sectors, and a perceived over-investment in the social sectors.

Sometimes associated with the fourth category of criticism above is the view that the MDGs should have included goals relating to means as well as ends - precursors or enablers of development, rather than merely development outcomes. The g7+ narrative, for example, can be interpreted as arguing that enabling goals must be achieved before fragile states can realistically be expected to achieve the MDGs or similar final goals. In making this kind of point, however, it is important bear in mind that enablers can also be ends in themselves - indeed the MDGs were intended to be mutually enabling and, in that sense, integrated.

From the specific perspective of fragile states, each of the above general criticisms has a particular kind of resonance. First, on the process point, the g7+ grouping has already strongly asserted its perspective on the post-2015 goals and will continue to do so.¹⁸ In addition, there are multiple survey and consultative exercises aimed at gathering the perspectives of poor people in developing countries, including fragile states. The post-2015 goals and

¹⁷ Sakiko Fukuda-Parr and Joshua Greenstein, "How Should MDG Implementation Be Measured: Faster Progress or Meeting Targets?" International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth, Working Paper, 2010.

¹⁸ For example, the communiqué from the 31 January to 1 February 2013 meeting of the High Level Panel included the following: 'The protection and empowerment of people is crucial. This will require peacebuilding and stronger domestic institutions—including effective, accountable and transparent governments and peaceful, just and equitable societies that protect and promote human rights and eliminate all forms of violence.' - http://www.un.org/sg/management/pdf/Monrovia_Communique_1_Feb_2013.pdf

targets will not be compiled by technocrats and adopted by stealth—though, by the same token, it cannot be taken for granted that they will be agreed by 2015, or at all.

Second, on the ‘one-size-fits-all’ point, the application of global goals and targets to individual nations for comparative monitoring purposes has been particularly disadvantageous to fragile states, and has in some cases been explicitly rejected by them.¹⁹ Given their starting points on many indicators, fragile states can often achieve good progress in absolute terms - for example, in reducing maternal mortality rates - while remaining stubbornly off track when measured against a global proportional reduction target like ‘reduce by three-quarters the maternal mortality ratio’. To give one example, Malawi reduced its infant mortality rate from 209 per 1000 live births to 111 between 1990 and 2007, an impressive achievement - but did not achieve the two-thirds reduction necessary to be considered ‘on track’ to achieve MDG4. In another example, Nepal is among the top ten performers in the world (taking all goals and targets together) in terms of absolute progress, but not in terms of progress relative to baselines.²⁰

Third, on the point about lack of ambition, the fact that the poverty reduction target was so easily achieved, thanks largely to the fact that China has lifted more than 660 million people out of absolute poverty since the 1980s, distracts attention from the fact that poverty remains stubbornly high in fragile states, and is likely - depending on inequality trends in non-fragile middle-countries - to become increasingly concentrated there. At least one-third of the world’s poor currently live in fragile states, compared to one-fifth in 1990; this is expected to increase to around one-half by 2030, with the absolute number of poor in fragile states remaining about where it has been since 1990, at not much less than 500 million.²¹

Fourth, on the point about missing fundamentals, fragile states obviously feel very keenly the absence of any reference to peacebuilding and statebuilding in the MDGs - an absence that is all the more surprising when one recalls the numerous references to peace, tolerance and justice in the Millennium Declaration’s articulation of ‘fundamental values’. Small island states, by contrast, perhaps feel more keenly the absence of any effective treatment of global and regional public goods, most notably climate change mitigation and support for regional infrastructure and regional institutions that in many cases substitute for weak national capacity. Related to this last point, as noted previously, is another possible criticism - that the MDGs, with their exclusive emphasis on final outcomes, tend to direct resources away from some of the structural enablers of development in fragile states. Support for regional institutions, for example, or for the development of national revenue enhancement measures, would fall into this category. Such things are not ends in themselves, in the way that freedom to carry on one’s life without fear of violence is an end in itself (as well as an enabler of other development outcomes) but, without them, some countries will never begin to make sustained progress toward the MDGs.

2. How has the world changed since the MDGs were drafted? Which global trends and uncertainties will influence the international development agenda over the next 10- 30 years?

The shape of global politics, security, multilateralism, aid, trade and connectivity has changed considerably since the MDGs were developed. Equally, our understanding of development opportunities and challenges, including climate change, urbanisation and shifting demographics, has evolved. In addition to changing circumstance, the post-2015 development framework will have to remain relevant and responsive to the following global trends that will take place over the likely 15-year timeframe (2015-2030).

Shifting geopolitics

The continued movement of power eastward, and towards South America, away from the United States and Europe is leading to fundamental geopolitical shifts. At the same time, the multilateral systems are failing to provide

¹⁹ Papua New Guinea determined that the MDGs were unrealistic when applied at the national level, so developed its own set of national targets within the MDG framework.

²⁰ Examples both drawn from Melamed and Sumner’s 2011 paper, cited above.

²¹ See Homi Kharas and Andrew Rogerson, “Horizon 2020”, Overseas Development Institute, 2012.

solutions to contemporary challenges (e.g. climate change and regulating world trade). The 1990s were a heyday for multilateralism, with many binding treaties developed and much optimism generated about the international communities ability to respond to global issues. Continued failures and lackluster outcomes across the board have since eroded that optimism, and has the potential to also impact on how the post-2015 development framework evolves, especially if addressing poverty and sustainability remain on separate tracks. The continued global financial instability and fiscal squeeze in high-income countries, may also limit the ambition of the post-2015 development framework.

Demographics

The populations of most g7+ member and Pacific island countries will age, and population growth will generally slow, but many developing countries will continue to be characterised by youthful populations, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa.²² Additionally, over the period 2015-2030, a number of g7+ member and Pacific states will experience a demographic dividend²³, which occurs when a country's population structure changes so that there are relatively more working age to dependent people, and this can be a strong driver of poverty alleviation under the right circumstances. There will also be continued migration from rural to urban areas, offering various opportunities (e.g. improved service delivery and economic growth opportunities) and challenges (e.g. population tensions, environmental degradation, and infrastructure pressures).

Resource use

Deepened resource use post-2000 has resulted in increased revenues/economic growth but also environmental degradation. Many environmental crises will worsen by 2030, and climate change will continue to be the most serious environmental problem facing Pacific and g7+ member states. But other issues, such the localised environmental damage caused by resource extraction in resource rich countries will continue to impact development outcomes. High-income countries are also responsible for many environmental issues, including continued and historic greenhouse gas emissions and the environmental damage caused abroad by multinational corporations – a reason amongst others for high-income states also coming under the umbrella of any new development goals. Other serious environmental challenges that are expected to impact development over this period include continued biodiversity loss, desertification (a serious problem in g7+ countries such as Chad and CAR), urban air pollution and overfishing (the latter is particularly concerning for some West African countries and Pacific tuna fisheries). Ensuring an equitable distribution of resource rents (including tax revenues) will also remain a challenge as resource rich, developing countries strive to improve the quality of lives for their citizens through improved service delivery and access to jobs.

The changing face of aid

The face of aid will continue to change markedly. Importantly, the rise of Middle Income Countries, of which a number of g7+ states now qualify, has led to increased South-South cooperation. Resultantly, the old club of DAC donors is no longer exclusive, and many recipient states are now also donors themselves. This in itself will lead to a challenging political discourse domestically as taxpayers question the validity of providing aid to other donor countries. Moreover, the emergence of new donors is significantly changing the way development aid is dispersed, with the laissez-faire style of Chinese assistance in the Pacific and Africa being a notable example. Private aid (philanthropists and privately funded NGOs) has also increased in proportion to official assistance and brings with it yet another style of aid delivery.

Poverty and our understanding of development

'By 2025 the locus of global poverty will overwhelmingly be in fragile, mainly low-income and African, states'²⁴. The nature of poverty has changed since the gestation period of the MDGs in the 1990s, with an increasing proportion of

²² For information on future Pacific demographics see Wadan Narsey *et al*, 'Population and Development in the Pacific Islands', UNFPA and USP Conference Paper, 2009. For details on future sub-Saharan Africa demographics see Victoria A. Velkoff and Paul R. Kowal, 'Population Aging in Sub-Saharan Africa: Demographic Dimensions', U.S. Census Bureau, 2006.

²³ See Andrew Mason, 'Demographic transition and demographic dividends in developed and developing countries', UN DESA Paper, 2005.

²⁴ Homi Kharas and Andrew Rogerson, 'Horizon 2020', Overseas Development Institute, 2012.

poor people now living in Middle Income Countries. This may be a transitory phenomenon, as the growth machine in such countries should continue to reduce poverty. Such growth machinery, however, is unlikely to function similarly in fragile states, which continue to have poor economic growth prospects over the period 2015-2030.²⁵ Ideas around 'human wellbeing' are emerging as an alternative to the traditional ways of conceptualising and measuring poverty. New indicators of national, local and personal development have emerged, such as economic and physical security, natural capital, and happiness, and these may increasingly be used alongside traditional measurements such as GDP to determine development outcomes.

3. Which issues do poor and vulnerable people themselves prioritise?

Perhaps the most damning criticism of the MDGs is the exclusionary process that led to their creation. Jan Vandemoortele, the co-architect of the MDGs, notes that 'any partnership among equals must stem from an attitude of intellectual humility of all parties concerned, a respect for national ownership and an openness to new ideas and different world views'.²⁶

And perhaps the greatest shift away from the MDGs will be redressing the lack of country level input, so that the Post-2015 development agenda can truly be a country-led exercise.

Since the 1990s, the increased use of participatory poverty assessments and surveys has resulted in greater knowledge of how poor people themselves define poverty and their development priorities. The World Bank's 1999 *Voices of the Poor*²⁷ study across 60 countries revealed the first comprehensive survey of citizen voices vis-à-vis development priorities. The common demands across most countries was 'a desire for a job, better connections to the rest of the world, a reduced threat of violence, and an end to the regular daily humiliations and disrespect that are too often the reality for poor people'.²⁸ The most recent global study was undertaken by CDA Collaborative Learning Projects in 2012, and highlights the desire of people to have more of a say in the way development efforts are 'conceived, funded, carried out and evaluated'.²⁹

Initial results from the 'My World'³⁰ global survey of citizen's priorities for the post-2015 goals highlight gaps in the scope of the current MDGs, and reveal how similar people's priorities are regardless of where they live. 'Better job opportunities', an honest and responsive government' and 'protection against crime and violence' feature prominently.

The intensive lobbying by NGOs, community based organisation and advocacy groups around the post-2015 development agenda is testimony that many priority issues were left out of the MDGs, and signifies the importance of these global goals on shaping policy and therefore funding opportunities. Aside from the very real dilemma of determining acceptable global development priorities, the voices of the very people that the development agenda is supposed to serve risks being drowned out by the lobbyists and influential interest groups.

So how do we include the voices of the people most in need, particularly in fragile states? Surveys such as those undertaken by the World Bank and CDA Collaborative Learning Projects certainly provide a useful global overview. But at the country level it is not just about collecting and analysing data – and certainly not via 'fly-in-fly-out'

²⁵ Homi Kharas and Andrew Rogerson, cited above, predict these changes will take place over the period till 2030.

²⁶ Quote sourced from Jan Vandemoortele, 'A fresh look at the MDGs', *Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy*, 2011.

²⁷ Available on the World Bank website - <http://bit.ly/colGaS>

²⁸ Claire Melamed, 'What do poor people want' published in *The Guardian Poverty Matters Blog*, 17 March 2011 - <http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/mar/17/what-poor-people-want>

²⁹ 'Time to Listen: Hearing People on the Receiving End of International Aid' was published by CDA Collaborative Learning Projects in November 2012 and was based on consultations with over 6,000 people in 20 countries.

³⁰ See the My World data at: <http://data.myworld2015.org/> These results are changing continuously as more people vote (currently 44,000 people have taken part in the survey from 188 different countries). These facts are correct as at 15th February 2013.

consultation exercises. A critique of the World Bank's country poverty assessments³¹ showed them to be weak in understanding the causes of poverty, the historical perspective and the social and political context. If we are to understand poverty, and therefore devise effective strategies to alleviate it, then we need a thorough understanding of these basic drivers and listen to the voices of the voiceless.

Many countries have engaged (or are in the process of engaging) their populations to determine the development priorities that matter most to the people. A far-reaching consultation exercise was undertaken in Timor Leste in late 2012, and revealed the following key messages from the people: Promote inclusive national dialogues, promote state ownership of the development agenda, create jobs, ensure access to justice, protect the environment and deal with climate change and protect people with disabilities.

Inclusive and responsive development depends first and foremost on building or strengthening the social contract between governments and citizens. The primary responsibility for improving people's lives rests with the representatives of the people. Governments need to be able to deliver the essential services that people need (e.g. schools, healthcare, safe water, electricity) and create the enabling environment for people to participate in a nation's equitable development (e.g. jobs, justice, safety). To achieve that there needs to be an inclusive policy space and governments need revenue, which requires a vibrant private sector and the means of the state to collect and redistribute taxes.

Development assistance should be just that – assistance – and not control the country's development agenda, and that means donor support must recognise, use and support country systems. This is even more important as the traditional social safety nets afforded within rural villages are breaking down with high rates of urban migration, and increasing vulnerability due to external economic shocks due to an increasingly interconnected world, and environmental shocks and susceptibility to natural disasters due to climate change.

4. What doesn't a business-as-usual scenario look like? Framing the post-2015 development agenda

The United Nations High Level Panel on the Post-2015 Development Agenda posed the following framing question³²: *What does a business as usual scenario look like?* However, it is clear from the preceding sections and the raft of literature to date on the successes and failures of the MDGs that a business-as-usual scenario is simply not a viable option. A more productive way of framing this section is to look to at a future that incorporates the lessons from the MDGs to help frame the development agenda in a manner that will help bring about development for all.

A focus on peacebuilding and statebuilding

For all their benefits, the MDG's largely overlooked the political and institutional realities to realise the United Nations Millennium Declaration³³ vision for a more peaceful, prosperous and just world. The starting point to rectify that omission is to frame new universal goals around peacebuilding and statebuilding.

First and foremost, for the global development agenda to respond to the needs of the people, there needs to be mechanisms in place that foster inclusive state-society dialogues and settlements to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development. This applies universally – from conflict affected and post conflict states, to relatively new countries seeking to build a sense of national identity and harmony, to established states that face sporadic incidents of social unrest and violence. Each country will clearly be at different points of this spectrum, but the principles of peacebuilding remain the same: that is, creating spaces for inclusive national political dialogues, establishing and strengthening the safety and security of people, and addressing injustices and increasing people's access to justice.

³¹ Lucia Hanmer, Graham Pyatt and Howard White (1999) 'What do the World Bank's Poverty Assessments teach us about Poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa?' in *Development and Change*, Volume 30, Issue 4, October 1999

³² http://www.un.org/sg/management/pdf/HLP_Framing_Questions.pdf

³³ <http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.htm>

While the MDGs gave us a framework of commendable goals to aim for, after a decade of implementation efforts we know that we cannot achieve these targets if the institutions of the state are not equipped to do so. We also know that when development partners attempt to do step in and replace state functions, the deficiencies of the state are merely amplified – not addressed so that one day they can assume their rightful role of serving the people they represent. Most importantly, the state apparatus must be able to lay the foundations for people to be gainfully employed, and generate and manage government revenues to deliver fair and accountable services.

Again, while every country is at a different stage of development, the importance of statebuilding applies universally as governments around the world struggle with issues of inequality, unemployment and civil unrest, and attempt to ensure the functions of state are responsive to the changing social, political and economic dynamics of society.

Development for All: Formulating the post-2015 development agenda

Drawing on some of the observations above, a broad approach to the formulation of the post-2015 development goals that is most likely to meet the needs of the diverse group of fragile states might be as follows. As noted above, we do not enter into any discussion of specific goals and targets, other than those of most direct relevance to fragile states.

The new framework should:

1. Ensure the views of people in developing countries, as gathered through surveys and other consultative processes, and the views of organised country groupings such as the g7+ and the Pacific island countries, are carefully considered and explicitly addressed during the process of formulation of the post-2015 goals and targets.
2. Maintain the following features of the MDGs: their ambition, simplicity, communicability, measurability and general emphasis on final outcomes for human wellbeing.
3. Place the post-2015 goals within the framework of the Millennium Declaration, with particular reference to the six fundamental values articulated therein (*freedom, equality, solidarity, tolerance, respect for nature, and shared responsibility*).
4. Move to absolute rather than proportional global targets in order to ensure that proportional targets are not applied at the national level, and instead invite individual countries to determine the level of their contributions to each target through national deliberative processes.
5. Avoid establishing goals specific to fragile states, but seek to introduce the smallest possible number of universal headline goals that address the major matters of concern to this diverse group of countries, where the majority of the world's poor will increasingly be concentrated.
6. Consider combining the aforementioned headline goals with others rather than restricting their application to fragile states - thus a goal relating to resilience might cover resilience to a range of possible shocks; a single broad goal might cover several global public goods including climate change mitigation and the free flow of trade; and a goal relating to justice and equality might cover g7+ concerns about peace and safety as well as broader concerns about discrimination on the basis of age, gender, race and other factors. Goal integration of this kind contributes to simplicity and increases the probability that concerns relating to security, vulnerability and state fragility will be appropriately reflected in the final outcome.
7. Applying the post-2015 development framework universally will ensure transnational issues are also taken into account, and this is especially important for resource rich developing countries that have suffered through tax evasion and environmental degradation.